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ABSTRACT 
A modal logic interpretation of belief and plausibility measures defined on infinite sets 
is established. As a special case, a modal logic interpretation of necessity and possibility 
measures defined on infinite sets is also established. It is proven in both cases that the 
interpretation is complete. These results establish, in effect, modal logic interpretations of
the Dempster-Shafer theory and possibility theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of connecting Dempster-Shafer theory and, especially, possibility the- 
ory with modal logic (or related provability logic) is by no means new [1, 3-  
5, 7, 12, 22, 27, 28, 34, 35]. However, previous efforts to develop this idea 
have concentrated, by and large, on investigating possibilistic logic and the logic 
of belief functions, and on determining their connections with established sys- 
tems of modal logic [7, 34]. This was done not only for numerical forms of 
the theories but also for their qualitative or comparative variants [1, 3, 4, 12, 
14]. Our motivation is different. We have tried to establish the usual semantics 
of modal logic as a possible unifying framework, within which various uncer- 
tainty theories can be interpreted and compared. Therefore our focus has been on 
interpretation of uncertainty theories within modal logic. This research project 
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was initiated by Resconi et al. [24] and further developed in a series of pa- 
pers [15, 20, 25]. 
All previous work in this area (including our own) is restricted to finite versions 
of uncertainty theories and finite models of modal logic. Contrary to the previous 
work, the aim of this paper is to develop a modal logic interpretation of belief 
and plausibility measures defined on infinite sets (frames of discernment). As is 
well known, these measures form the basis of evidence theory [32], which is lately 
referred to as Dempster-Shafer theory. Clearly, we have to use infinite models of 
modal ogic for this purpose. As a special case, a modal ogic interpretation is also 
established for necessity and possibility measures defined on infinite sets. As is 
well known, these measures form the basis of possibility theory [6]. 
Our work is closely related to the work of Ruspini [27, 28], who seems to have 
been the first one to realize that the probability of necessity behaves like a belief 
function. He utilizes this observation to develop an interpretation of both basic 
evidence functions of Dempster-Shafer theory and Dempster's rule of combination 
based on the epistemic logic of Hintikka [16]. In addition to differences in moti- 
vation, our work extends Ruspini's contribution in three directions. First, Ruspini 
utilizes an epistemic logic that is equivalent to the modal system $5, while our 
interpretation is based on the much weaker system D [17, 18]. Second, Ruspini 
does not provide a proof of completeness of his interpretation, while we do; that 
is, we show that for any given belief measure there is a model of modal logic 
satisfying our requirements hat yields the given belief measure. Third, we cover 
both finite and infinite frames of discernment and models of modal logic, while 
Ruspini deals only with the finite case. On the other hand, we do not address the 
interpretation of Dempster's rule of combination. 
Ruspini also provides an interpretation ofpossibility distributions [29-31 ]. His 
interpretation is based on graded accessibility relations, called similarity relations. 
On the contrary, we utilize our interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory and the 
well-known relation between ecessity/possibility measures and belief/plausibility 
measures to characterize a class of models of modal logic that yield necessity and 
possibility measures. 
Also connected with our work is the idea of probability of provability. This 
idea was informally suggested by Pearl [21-23] as a possible interpretation of 
Dempster-Shafer theory, and further developed by Smets [35]. The connection is
based on the fact that certain kinds of provability correspond to necessity in some 
systems of modal logic [2]. Since neither Pearl nor Smets is sufficiently specific 
about he kind of provability they deal with, it is hard to characterize this connec- 
tion more precisely. Contrary to our work, Pearl and Smets deal only with finite 
domains and do not prove completeness of their interpretation. However, Smets 
considers the problem of conditioning, which we do not address in this paper. 
For the sake of completeness we should also mention the work of Fagin and 
Halpern [8-11] on logics for reasoning about knowledge and probability. Their 
setting is somewhat similar to ours, but they are interested in the development of
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a complete formal system to reason about knowledge and probability, and not in 
the interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Although we briefly introduce the concept of a model of modal logic in the 
next section, basic knowledge of modal logic [17] as well as some background 
in Dempster-Shafer theory [32, 33] and possibility theory [6] is desirable for full 
understanding of this paper. 
2. BASICS OF  MODAL LOGIC  
Modal logic is an extension of classical propositional logic. It can be character- 
ized as a logic of logical necessity and possibility. Its language consists of the set 
of atomic propositions or propositional variables; logical connectives --,, v, A, ---~, 
~--~; modal operators of necessity, [], and possibility, ©; and supporting symbols 
( , ), { , } . . . . .  Objects of interest are formulas: 
• an atomic proposition is a formula; 
• if p and q are formulas, then so are --,p, pvq ,  pAq,  p~ q, p ~ q, 
[2p, Op. 
When developed formally, different modal systems are characterized by differ- 
ent sets of axioms (i.e. special formulas) and inferential rules. Since we are not 
interested in developing formal systems in this paper, we omit discussion of this 
matter. 
The meaning of a formula is its truth value in a given context. Various contexts 
are usually expressed in terms of models of modal logic. A model, M, of modal 
logic is a triple 
M = (W,R ,V) ,  
where W, R, V denote, respectively, a set of possible worlds, a binary relation on 
W, and a value assignment function, by which truth (T) or falsity (F) is assigned to 
each atomic proposition in each possible world (i.e. V : W x Q > {T, F}, where 
Q is the set of all atomic propositions). The value assignment function is induc- 
tively extended to all formulas in the usual way, the only interesting cases being 
V(w, Op)=T iff for a l luE  W, (w,u) E R implies V(u ,p)=T 
and 
V(w, Op)=T iff there isu e W such that (w, u) E RandV(u ,p)=T.  
The relation R is usually called an accessibility relation; we say that world u 
is accessible to world w when (w, u) e R. Different systems of modal logic are 
characterized by different additional requirements on the accessibility relation R. 
In our further considerations in this paper we assume that R is serial. R is serial 
i f f for all w 6 W'there is u E W such that (w, u) ~ R. Formally, this requirement 
corresponds to the system D [17]. 
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3. BASICS OF DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY 
Let f2, A denote nonempty sets and P(f2), T'(A) their power sets. A class 
C of subsets of a set ~ is called a multiplicative class if A n B is in C when- 
ever A and B are in C. A class g of subsets of a set f2 is called an additive 
class if A U B is in g whenever A and B are in g. Suppose C is a multiplica- 
tive subclass of T'(f2) containing both t3 and f2, and suppose 79 is a multiplica- 
tive subclass of 79(A) containing both 13 and A. We call h : C > 79 a N- 
homomorphism if h(0) = 13, h(f2) = A, and h(A N B) = h(A) n h(B) for all 
A, BEC.  
We call a function Bel that maps a multiplicative subclass C of 7~(f2), which 
contains both 0 and f2, into the real interval [0, 1] a belief measure if the following 
holds: 
1. Bel(0) = 0, 
2. Bel ( f2)= 1, 
3. Bel(A) > y~{(-1) l t l+lBel(n ict  Ai) I 0 5~ I c {1 . . . . .  n}} for every 
collection {A, A1 . . . . .  An} _c C such that Ai c A (i = 1 . . . . .  n) and for 
every n. 
We call a function P1 that maps a additive subclass g of T'(f2), which contains 
both 0 and g2, into the real interval [0, 1] a plausibility measure if the following 
holds: 
1. P1(13) = 0, 
2. PI(f2) = 1, 
3. PI(A) < ~{( - l ) l t l+ lP l (U ic tA i )  I 13 5 k I c_ {1 . . . . .  n}} for every collection 
{A, Al . . . . .  An} c ~ such that A c_ Ai (i -= 1 . . . . .  n) and for every n. 
REMARK 1 Notice that if Bel is a belief measure on C, then the function PI 
defined on the additive class E = {A I A c C} by PI(A) = 1 - Bel(A-) is a plausi- 
bility measure. (A denotes the complement of A in f2.) 
THEOREM 1 (Shafer [33]) LetC be a multiplicative subclass of  79(f2) contain- 
ing both 13 and f2. A function Bel, mapping C into [0, 1], is a belief measure if 
and only if there exists a set A,  an algebra 79 of  subsets of  A,  a finitely additive 
probability measure P on 79, and a n-homomorphism h : C ~ 79 such that 
Bel = P o h. 
If not specified otherwise in the following, we assume C to be T~(~). 
4. INTERPRETATION OF DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY 
Let X denote some nonempty universal set (frame of discernment). The set 
of atomic propositions Q consists of all propositions of the form ea, where A is 
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an arbitrary subset of X. The proposition eA is supposed to mean that a given 
incompletely characterized element of X lies within A. We also assume that 
each particular world (of some given model) gives its own unique answer to the 
classification question, i.e., one and only one formula e~xl is true in each world, 
where x ~ X. This, and proper relations among valuations of ea for different 
A, are guaranteed by the following requirements on valuation function V of any 
given model of modal ogic: 
• V(w,  ex) --= T for all w ~ W; 
• V(w,  ea --+ eB) = T for all w 6 W and for all A, B c 7:'(X) such that 
ACB;  
• V(w,  ea ---> ~ec)  = T for all w 6 W and for all A, C c 7~(X) such that 
ANC =O; 
• V(w,  eAUB ~ (eA V eB)) = T for all w E W and for all A, B E ~(X) .  
To be able to develop a modal logic interpretation f Dempster-Shafer theory 
also for the infinite case, we add to the classical models of modal logic a finitely 
additive probability measure on the set of possible worlds. From now on, a model 
of modal ogic is meant o be the quadruple 
M=(W,R,V ,P ) ,  
where W, R, and V are as above, and P is a finitely additive probability measure 
on W. [We implicitly assume that P is defined on the whole power set ~(W).]  
THEOREM 2 Given a model M -- (W, R, V, P) of  modal logic that satisfies 
the above stated requirements regarding R and V, the model yields a belief 
measure given by 
BelM(A) = P({w E W ] V(w, [3ea) = T}) 
and a plausibility measure given by 
P1M(A) = P({w E W I V(w,  Oea) = T}) 
for  all A c 7"9(X). That is, the belief measure of  A can be viewed as the prob- 
ability of  worlds for  which De a is true, and similarly the plausibility measure 
of  A can be viewed as the probability of  worlds for  which Oe z is true. 
Proof In the standard modal ogic, the equivalence Op +-~ ~[ ]~p is valid for 
any formula p [ 17]. From our requirements onvaluation function, it also follows 
that ~ez ~ e~ for any A 6 79(X). From these facts and from the additivity of P, 
we have 
P1M(A) ----- P({w ~ W I V(w,  ©ea) = T}) 
= P({w ~ W I V(w, ~O~ez)  = T}) 
= P(W)  -- P({w E W I V(w,  De~-) = T}) = 1 - BelM(A) 
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for all A 6 72(X). So, by Remark 1, it is sufficient o show that BelM is a belief 
measure. Define a mapping h : 72(X) > 72(W) such that 
h(A) = {w E W ] V(W, E2eA) =T} 
for all A ~ 72(X). It is obvious that 
V(lld, eANB +'~ (ea /X eB)) : T for all w c W and for all A, B ~ 72(X) 
follows from the four requirements on the valuation function. Utilizing another 
well-known equivalence from modal logic [ 17], 
D(p A q) ++ (Op A Dq), 
we get 
h(A M B) = {w E W ] V(w,  E]eanB) = T} 
: {to G W [ V(to, [~ea A VleB) : T} 
: {w C W [ V(w, Dea) = T} M {w 6 W I V(w, C3e,) = T} 
= h(A) (q h(B) 
for all A, B 6 72(X). From the first requirement on valuation functions we also 
get h(X)  = W, and from the first and the third requirements we have h(0) = 0. 
All together, h is a n-homomorphism of X into W. By using Theorem 1, we get 
the conclusion that BelM is a belief function. • 
5. COMPLETENESS 
In this section, we show the completeness of our interpretation of Dempster- 
Shafer theory, and illustrate a possible simplification of the construction in the 
proof of the following theorem by a simple example. 
THEOREM 3 The interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory introduced in The- 
orem 2 is complete, i.e.,for every belief measure Bel (or plausibility measure PI) 
on 72(X), there is a model M of  modal logic, satisfying the above requirements, 
such that 
for  every A ~ 72(X). 
Proof Using Theorem 
Bel(A) = BelM(A), 
1, we know that there is a set Y, a finitely addi- 
tive probability P on Y, and a n-homomorphism h :72(X) > 72(Y) such that 
Bel(A) = P(h(A))  for all A 6 72(X). Inspecting Shafer's proof of Theorem 1 
[33] (based on results of Revuz and Huneycutt [19, 26]), we know we can take 
Y = 72(X) andh(A)  = 7 2(A)  for all A ~ 72(X), so that there is af initely 
additive probability P on 72 (X) such that Bel (A) = P (72 (A)) for all A c 7 2 (X) .  
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Consider the following model of modal ogic: 
M = (W,R ,V ,P ' ) ,  
where 
• W=7)(X) -{0};  
• R is such that (A, B) • R i f fA ,  B E7 ) (X) - {0} and B _C A; 
• V is such that V(B, ea) = T if f3(B) • A, for all B E W and A c 5D(X), 
where 3 is an arbitrary fixed mapping that maps W into X in such a way that 
3(B) • B for all B • W; and 
• P'  is restriction of P on W. [It is still a finitely additive probability, since 
0 = Bel(0) = P({0}).] 
Clearly, M satisfies the above requirements regarding R and V. It remains to 
show that BelM(A) = Bel(A) for all A • 7)(X). For all B e W, the accessible 
worlds are all nonempty subsets of B, which means that []eA is true in B if and 
only if B _c A. From this observation and the definitions of Bel~t and P', we have 
BelM(A) = P'({w • W I V(w, []eA) = T}) 
= P'({B •7  9 (X) -{0}1 B_C A}) 
= P (7) (A) -- {0}) = P(7)(A)) = Bel(A) 
for all A c 7)(X). • 
The construction i troduced in Theorem 3 requires quite a big set of possible 
worlds, which in a particular situation eed not be necessary. To illustrate this point, 
consider the following simple example. Let the universal set X be the set of all real 
numbers, let Y be the set {o~, fl}, and let P be a probability measure on Y induced 
by the probability distribution p~ = 0.32 and p~ = 0.68. Suppose, we want to 
find a modal logic model for a belief function Bel given by BeI(A) = P(h(A)) 







[3, 7.2] g: A and [9, 10] ~Z A, 
[3, 7.2] c_ A and [9, 10] 5g A, 
[3, 7.2] g: A and [9, 10] c A, 
[3, 7.2] _c A and [9, 10] _c A 
for all A c 7)(X). (Bel is a belief function by Theorem 1.) 
In this case, we can get a significantly simpler model than by the construction 
in the proof of the Theorem 3. Define M = (W, R, V, P'), where W = X U Y, 
R = {(oe, z) I z 6 [3, 7.2]} U {(fl, y) I Y c [9, 10]} U {(x,x) [ x 6 W}, 
V(x, ea) = T iff x C X and x • A or x = ce and 5 • A 
orx=f land9.5  •A ,  
for all A • 7)(X), and P'(A U B) = P(B) for all A 6 7)(X) and all B 6 7)(Y). 
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Let us look, for example, at the interval [2, 9.3]: 
Bel([2, 9.3]) = P(h([2,  9.3])) = P (a )  = 0.32 
and 
BelM([2, 9.3]) = P'({w c W ] V(w, [ ]e[2,9.3])  = T}) 
= P'({ot} U [2, 9.3]) = P (~)  = 0.32. 
In this example the cardinality of W is the continuum, which is definitely smaller 
than the cardinality of 7~(X) - {0}. 
6. POSSIBILISTIC CASE 
In this section, as in [20] for the finite case, we examine interpretations of
necessity and possibil ity measures. 
We call a function Nec that maps 7:'(X) into the real interval [0, 1] a necessity 
measure if and only if 
Nec(0) = 0, 
Nec(X) = 1, 
for any {At}teT ~ "P(X), where T is an arbitrary nonempty index set. A function 
Pos that maps 7:'(X) into the real interval [0, 1[ is called a possibility measure if 
and only if 
Pos(0) = 0, 
Pos(X) = 1, 
for any {At}ter c_ T'(X), where T is an arbitrary nonempty index set. 
REMARK 2 It is easy to show that even in the infinite case every necessity 
measure is a belief measure and every possibility measure is a plausibility measure 
and that the well -known relationship 
Pos(A) = 1 - Nec(A), (*) 
holds for all A E T)(X) [i.e., for every necessity measure Nec on X, the function 
Pos given by (*) is .a possibility measure, and vice versa]. 
Due to these facts, we can use our interpretation f Dempster-Shafer theory also 
for possibil ity theory. The question is, as in [20] for the finite case, what class of 
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models corresponds topossibility theory. Not surprisingly, the answer is almost he 
same: the models with transitive and connected accessibility relation and finitely 
additive probability continuous from above on 142 = {{w 6 W I V(w, Pea) = 
T} I A E P(X)}. [R is transitive iff (u, v) E R and (v, w) c R imply (u, w) ~ R 
for all u, v, w E W; it is connected iff for all u, v ~ W, (u,v) 6 R or (v, u) E R. 
A set function P : "R(X) > [0, 1] is continuous from above on ..4 ___ 79(X) iff 
{En} c .4, El D E2 D . . .  andNn~l E, 6 .4imply lim, P (E , )  = P(r--I,~__l En).] 
We justify this claim by the following two theorems. 
THEOREM 4 Given a model M = (W, R, V, P) of modal logic such that 
V satisfies the above requirements, R is transitive and connected, and P is 
continuous from above on l/V, the model yields a necessity measure given by 
NeCM(A) = P({w E W I V(w, Nea) = T}) 
and a possibility measure given by 
P1M(A) = P({w ~ W I V(w, Oea) = T}) 
for all A c 79(X). 
Proof Due to Remark 2, we only have to show that 
NecM( N At) = infNecM(At) 
\ tET / t~T 
for any {At}toT ~ 79(X), where T is an arbitrary nonempty index set. 
For C 6 79(X), the set {w 6 W I V(w, Oec) = T} is denoted by Tc. Observe 
that, for any A, B 6 7~(X), it is true that TA ~ TB or TB ___ TA. Suppose this is not 
true. Then, there are u 6 TA and v 6 TB such that u ~ TB and v ¢ Ya. However, 
by connectedness we have (u, v) 6 Ror  (v,u) 6 R. I f (u ,v )  6 R, thenfrom 
transitivity of R and the fact that v ~ TA we get u ¢ TA, which is contradiction. 
Similarly, from (v, u) c R we would get v ~ TB. Therefore, TA C 7-B orT-B ___ TA. 
This implies that, given an arbitrary fixed family {At}toT ~ 79(X) for some 
nonempty index set T, the family {TA, }t~r can be ordered by set inclusion. More- 
over, we can find a sequence {']'a, }ic~= 1 such that TA, 6 {TA, }tEr ,  7-A, DD_ "-fa,+l for 
all i, and f')i~=l TA, = Tn, oTa,. Therefore, we have 
NeCM At = P t~rAt = P i 
and also (by continuity from above of P on 14;) 
P(  fi'-fA~)i=l = Ii~n P(TA,) = inf P(TA,) =- t~T " 
THEOREM 5 The interpretation of possibility theory introduced inTheorem 4is 
complete, i.e., for any necessity measure Nec on X, there is a model 
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M = (W, R, V, P) of  modal logic such that R is connected and transitive, 
V satisfies our requirements, P is continuous from above on MJ, and 
Nee(A) = NeCM(A) 
for  all A ¢ 79(X). 
Proof Assume that we are given some necessity measure Nec on X. Define 
the dual possibility measure Pos to Nec in the usual way: 
Pos(A) = 1 - Nec(A-) 
for all A E 79(X). 
Consider the model M = (W, R, V, P), where W = X, 
(u, v) E R iff Pos({u}) < Pos((v}), 
V(I I ,  eA) = T iff u ¢ A 
for all u E X and A c 7)(X), and P(TA) = Nee(A). P can be arbitrarily extended 
to 7P(X); the extension is not relevant. Next we show that P is well defined. 
Assume that for some A, B c ~(X)  we have 7-a = TB and Nec(A) ¢ Nec(B). 
Without loss of generality, we can assume that Nee(A) < Nee(B). This means 
that there is some x E X such that x E A-, x E B, and Pos({x}) > Pos(B). This 
implies flint for any y E X such that Pos({y}) _> Pos({x}) it has to be true that 
y E B. However. this means that x E TB and x ~ Ta, which is a contradiction. So 
P is well defined. It is clear from our definitions that V satisfies our requirements 
and R is transitive and connected. Continuity of P from above on M2 follows from 
the definition of P and from the property Nec(['-'lt~T At) = inft~T Nec(At) of the 
necessity measure Nec. Finally, by definition of P, we have 
Nec(A) = P(~4) = P({w E W ] V(w, ~ea) = T}) = NeCM(A) 
for all A ¢ 79(X). • 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Modal logic interpretations of Dempster-Shafer theory and possibility theory 
were established for the finite case in our previous papers [ 15] and [20], respec- 
tively; this paper extends these interpretations to the infinite case. Although our 
intuitions about the two theories are not substantially enhanced by these exten- 
sions, we believe that the presented results are significant for at least two reasons. 
First, they show that it is indeed possible to extend the proposed interpretations 
to the infinite case and at the same time keep all the basic properties. This is not 
obvious, since there are examples of notions for which the generalization to the 
infinite case is not so direct (e.g. the Shannon entropy). Secondly, these results 
furnish further support for suitability of the proposed interpretations. 
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We intend to employ these interpretations, for both finite and infinite frames of 
discernment, o some of the foundational issues in the two theories that are still 
not fully resolved. We also intend to investigate various practical utilizations of 
the interpretations. 
Results presented inthis paper undoubtedly add further credibility to the research 
program of developing a hierarchical uncertainty metatheory based upon modal 
logic, which is stated in [24]. However, many more results will be needed before 
the stated aims are achieved. 
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